Controlling Our Internal and External Borders

In a recent issue of *Culture Wars*, there appeared an extensive historical and analytical article entitled “The Anti-Defamation League and America's Jewish Culture of Surveillance,” written by Michael Timmons. It is proper for it to be known that I do not know Michael Timmons personally nor anything about him, nor even whether he is now using a protective pseudonym in this case, instead of his actual name. But, because one of the matters of moment he has examined happens to be something I know more than a little about—though I was not directly involved in these events (neither in the initial detection, nor in the deeper investigation, nor in the later cover-ups)—I have with some hesitation decided to write this supplement. My purpose is to bring forth some further facts of import and then to draw out some of their implications for our realistic “strategic defense-in-depth of the homeland.”

The temptation of over-centralization

By disclosing, in part, what I do know—and how I very unexpectedly came to know of it during the years 1991-1996—I hope to illuminate our understanding of some deeper aspects of U.S. national security and of America's purported national sovereignty. For, if a country cannot control its own internal and external borders—both physical and electronic boundaries, and their “overlaps”—to what extent does it have sovereignty? To what extent may a country even have adequate national security under modern conditions without thereby becoming a Counter-Intelligence/Surveillance Police State? It is a difficult matter, and the danger—the temptation—to over-centralization is always there. In any case, control of one's borders becomes much more difficult under current technological conditions, where one constantly expects ever more advanced, rapidly changing, and deftly combined forms of technology, even the appearance of what are sometimes technically called “breakthrough technologies” which “drive doctrine and strategy” and suddenly cross an unexpected, and oft-ambiguous, threshold, even irreversibly so, as in the photoelectric effect, as Solzhenitsyn also understood a certain threshold of moral evil.

Without now going into any classified information and without mentioning any specific names involved in covert activities, I nevertheless believe that I shall be able to unveil some historical reality here and lead us to consider some of the fuller implications of “the ADL Case”—and also without thereby bringing about what I am so keenly trying to insure against: namely, that my remarks will impart a sense of moral paralysis or a sense of futility, and foster a frightened or slothful disposition to dismiss

---

1 See *Culture Wars* Magazine (January 2014—Vol. 33 No. 2), pp.16-35. The last words of the article, on page 35, are “Endnotes available upon request.” I have not yet seen these notes, but my proposed contribution does not now seem to require those notes. For, I mainly intend to offer some additional facts to one specific portion of that article, and thereby shed some further light on the historical reality of a set of events and actions made public in 1993.
such issues, or at least to put them, by way of avoidance, on the “too-hard-to-handle pile.”

**Nightmarish scenarios**

This latter set of risks once surrounded me, when, amidst the Special Operations Forces (SOF) I was invited (and soon obliged) to discuss the nature and range of advanced Biological Warfare Weapons—neuroscience and nanotechnologies, and micro-organisms and complex toxins (like the marine toxins)—and the means of delivering them reliably and deceptively, whether targeting the pollinators (the bees) or even through the open channels of public health programs and the administration of new vaccines. Moreover, I once asked some SOF operators: “Where does one take a bio-contaminated, multi-million dollar helicopter—or the contaminated, maybe even still infectious pilots who were unknowingly lured-and-trapped into a bio-contaminated area while hoping to rescue a downed aviator?”—“O! Sir, I wish you hadn’t asked me that question, and I wish you also hadn’t told me last week about that bio-agent that only dissolves the human eyeball—for I have been dreaming about them ever since, and about my own potentially endangered little children.”

From this anecdote and the wholehearted response of a good officer, perhaps my abiding concern is clearer now about not inducing a sense of powerlessness or futility. In light of this suggestive set of facts from another strategic context, and specifically from something that actually transpired during my talks within the military Special Operations Community, we see the risks of conveying certain forms of truth. For example, when specific bio-weapons may irreversibly affect their fertility or their eyesight, even the most courageous of SOF combatants are attentive and fearful, also for the welfare of their children.

To return now to Michael Timmons’s article.

**ADL immunity**

Early in his *Culture Wars* article (on page 18), Michael Timmons says: “While the ADL [the Anti-Defamation League] has been largely immune from criticism, they did have a large public relations nightmare which took place in 1993.” (18) He then cites a source who briefly summarizes the ADL’s purported embarrassment. Then Timmons adds: “In spite of those damaging revelations [about the ADL’s keeping covert files—to include those somehow pilfered and acquired from classified police files in the city of San Francisco—files apparently kept on a variety of groups actually or potentially unsympathetic to Israel or to the perceived, larger Jewish interests], the ADL was never prosecuted and those 48 felony counts were dropped.” (18—my emphasis added). Timmons then quotes The American Mercury which once purported to know a little more about a “deal that was worked out [seven years later] in 2000,” whereby at least part of what went on earlier in the ADL case was supposedly disclosed, to include the unsurprising final outcome before the Law and Justice System: the ADL’s effective exculpation and continued operation as a presumably tax-exempt human rights organization.

**My history of the case**

Here is how I came to know about this case; and also how I was contacted about such “internal surveillance matters” in the first place.

**The US Global Strategy Council**

It all began around 1990 with my being invited by Dr. Ray Cline to become a member of the U.S. Global Strategy Council, at the recommendation of his long-time friend, Donald F.B. “Jamie” Jameson,
who was then the Director of the Jamestown Foundation in Washington D.C. Both men were men of action as well as strategic-minded scholars, and they both had had long, widely esteemed, and honorable careers in the Central Intelligence Agency, Ray Cline even joining the inchoate agency in 1949 after his diverse service in O.S.S., and Jamie Jameson (a 1945 Annapolis Graduate) being infected by the polio virus in 1955 in the line of duty, while working with a seeming defector out of East Germany. That infection was likely a deliberate act, a form of biological warfare, which later confined the clandestine operator to a wheelchair. When I came to know him he was most of the time in a wheelchair, but always so gracious and polite and selfless in his generosity. He said to me one day: “You must meet Ray Cline.” (Dr. Cline was to die March of 1996, Mr. Jameson in September of 2007.)

**Carving up the Middle East**

The first discussions I heard and partook of at the Global Strategy Council meetings and seminars were conducted during the First Gulf War—its preparations, conduct, and the aftermath. There were rather senior persons present and most of them were highly intelligent and very articulate. You soon knew “where they stood and why.” I remember well hearing some of the Jewish participants express not only a grave distrust of President George Bush (a close personal friend of Ray Cline for years), but also a great fear that Israel would lose its “freedom of action” and “be turned into a Crematorium”—that last word is exact. I heard deeply analytical recommendations about the utility of having “a tri-partite division (dismemberment) of Saudi Arabia”—and also the same with Iraq (even then attentive to the predominantly Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi‘ite sections). The oil-rich Shi‘ite portions of Eastern Saudi Arabia were closely attended to. But these are only a few salient examples, most of which—especially the vulnerabilities and needs of Israel—were openly discussed with ardent intensity.

**Interesting Israeli contacts**

Some of the participants gradually spoke in private to me and spoke even more candidly. A few, liking some of my comments and also at first thinking that I was Jewish, wanted to know if I would like to speak with some Israeli Generals, in person and even by phone, when they visited the United States. They were already surprised that I had known of General Yehoshafat Harkabi (d.1994) and of his excellent works, especially *Israel’s Fateful Hour* ² (1988); and that I also somewhat understood how and why Harkabi had gradually changed his own fundamental views, especially about the increasingly self-sabotaging, overly intransigent “Nationalism of the Jewish Nation.”³ Some of my colleagues at the Council meetings were also surprised that I was aware of Lakam (Lekem), which is a lesser known Israeli Intelligence Agency specifically and especially focused on Scientific and Technological Intelligence (S&T). This foreign intelligence service will come into our considerations again later, as well.

---

² Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Israel’s Fateful Hour* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1988). The publisher’s note says that the English translation here presented “is based on a Hebrew work, *Hachraot Goraliot*” and was copyrighted “in 1986 by Am Oved, Tel Aviv.” In his Acknowledgements, General Harkabi also speaks of how the American Edition is an updated and expanded version of the original Hebrew text and of the British edition in English. It cannot be recommended too highly that a reader should especially read and savor General Harkabi’s Chapter 5, entitled “Nationalistic Judaism,” pages 138-193.

³ In 1978, General Harkabi (1921-1994)—who had earlier, from 1955-1959, been the Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence—wrote a book, entitled *Three Concepts of Arab Strategy* (1978), which was noteworthy published by the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith. Towards the end of his life, he was a visiting scholar and visiting professor at Princeton University, as well as a visiting scholar in Washington D.C. itself, at the Brookings Institution.
Discussing strategy
Over the next few years, I maintained these worthwhile conversations, both in person and sometimes by telephone, local and long-distance. But I was always careful about what I said on the telephone, in part because I was sometimes not sure about the identity of my interlocutor, whether he was an active-duty Israeli officer or a retired officer (like Harkabi) and now an advisor or at least some kind of consultant. We almost always spoke about cultural and strategic matters, sometimes even about history and grand strategy, such as the influence of British thinker, B.H. Liddell Hart, on Israeli strategic thinking, and not only in the 1967 Six-Day War.

Security driven silence
In 1992, I was unexpectedly invited to be on the Graduate Faculty of the Defense Intelligence College (soon to be renamed the Joint Military Intelligence College), which was part of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.); and that, for sure, had consequences concerning some of my conversations while at the Global Strategy Council and afterwards, especially if I were to speak, knowingly with a foreign military officer, not only someone, even a putative civilian, from a foreign intelligence agency. For, given the higher security clearances I would now be investigated for, and be required to have in order to teach, I had to report any and all contacts with Foreign Nationals, even when they were considered friendly allies. When I told this fact to my previous interlocutors, American and otherwise, the conversations stopped at once. This was also a great relief to me, and I never got to meet in person a few of the more senior persons who were then soon to come to Washington, D.C. and apparently eager to meet me.

The price for offending Israel
It turned out, moreover, that Ray Cline's prediction to me came to pass. President Bush would not win re-election. That is to say, President Bush, in spite of his unusually high public ratings after the First Gulf War, would be “dumped,” because he (and James Baker) had especially, and even contemptuously, antagonized and even humiliated the Israelis and their various supporters abroad, many of whom were Ray Cline's own Jewish friends, as he told me. For instance, because of the U.S. Patriot Missiles placed on Israeli soil during the Gulf War—but with American custodial units only permitted to be with and operate those defensive missiles—the Israelis believed that they were losing their freedom of action and maneuver, as well as their sovereignty and autonomy in their own national self-defense and “strategic defense-in-depth” of their Nation. Would foreign troops, U.N. or U.S. troops, also soon be put on the Golan Heights to “protect” Israel? This was also a keenly expressed fear.

Perceptive students
After William Clinton was elected in November of 1992 and sworn in in January 1993, some other things soon came to my attention from my graduate students at the Joint Military Intelligence College—several of whom were from the State Department, the F.B.I., both N.S.A and D.I.A. civilians, and not just military officers (and a few warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers). The highest degree the College granted was a Master’s Degree in Strategic Intelligence, and many of the students were not only very intelligent, but also well educated, some even already having doctoral degrees from institutions with high standards. It was an unique challenge and very special and enlivening place to be for some three years, before I was invited to go to the U.S. Air Force Academy. I could not, even now, adequately express what a rich environment it was to teach in, and I became very close to many of the students.
A few of these students were gravely concerned about some “security lapses” and potential dangers to our country, especially given the “intelligence sharing” we were then conducting under the new political regime—what we were sharing, for example, with the “new” Russian Interior Ministry (M.V.D.), and what we shared with other countries, not only with our specially privileged English-speaking Allies (Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).

One evening, at the Officers’ Club on Bolling Air Force Base—where the Joint Military Intelligence College was located, in southeast Washington, D.C.—a few of them discreetly mentioned to me what was then in the newspapers: namely about how a certain Tax-Exempt, “Anti-Bigotry” Foundation (Organization) had somehow gained access to, penetrated, and obtained Classified Police Files on the West Coast—rather complete files on certain groups and persons ostensibly under suspicion, and then this Foundation passed this sensitive information on to a foreign intelligence service, which itself then proceeded to conduct its own operations, as they saw fit, within the very borders of the domestic United States. These thoughtful students strongly hoped that such an Organization—Foundation—would not only be punished for their criminal actions, but would also, for sure, lose their tax-exempt status permanently.

The students did not get more specific, except to say that two of the suspected police officers who were thought to have transferred this classified “surveillance” information to that Private Organization, had fled the country—apparently having gone to Australia. Both of those police officers were from the San Francisco Police Department.

Enter Lakam

Some time later, a student from the F.B.I. just happened to mention that same set of actions, but in a different context. For, he said that this case was now a very hot case in the F.B.I.—especially in the now-alerted Counter-Intelligence of F.B.I., its Division Five—but he said that he could not talk about it, because the F.B.I. just classified the case. (In 1994-1995, Louis Freeh was still the Director (his tenure being from 1993-2001).) I was understandably astonished at this decision, and I said, in my callowness, “Why did the Bureau immediately do that?” He told me that “that’s what they always do when they want to hide or bury a case, and to thwart or stifle discussion—also to keep potentially even more embarrassing information from turning up.” Then came a little slip, when he said: “There’s even an Israeli General now coming in from California to meet with Congress as well as with key persons in the Bureau.” I said: “Is he coming in, at least indirectly, from the Silicon Valley, and is he still possibly in contact with the S&T Intell Agency, Lakam?” He replied: “It is possible, but how did you know that, sir?” I then said: “Is the general’s name, by chance, Brigadier General Shimon Erem?” “Yes, it is, and how did you know that?” “O it was only a slight inference from some of my own earlier conversations with colleagues a few years ago about this special character. He was once even a SOF combatant commander for Israel, but retired in 1970, when he then moved to Los Angeles, I believe. But, he travels widely.” Added to my recollections, however, was also my sense of the then-current meaning of “co-operation” and the “Pax Israelica”. Such is also part of the larger “intelligence sharing” that we are still deeply involved in—and have long been involved in—though perhaps primarily not as grateful beneficiaries, but, rather, more often as “useful idiots.”
A discredited Admiral

It is reliably known that Admiral Bobby Ray Inman was never forgiven after he, as the Head of N.S.A. (1977-early 1981), cut back the scope, merely the range, of what N.S.A. had been sharing with—giving to—Israel from its clandestine collection of signals intelligence (SIGINT) all over the world. (Inman, known to be not very sympathetic with Israel, was later also very strong for the harsh punishment in 1987 of the Israeli spy in U.S. Naval Intelligence, Johnathan Pollard.) The ethnic Jewish journalist, William Safire (d. 2009), known to me personally as an honorable man, nonetheless vigorously, unrelentingly, led the later (indeed seemingly vengeful) discrediting of Admiral Inman himself, and thereby blocked his proposed appointment (16 December 1993) as the new Secretary of Defense (to replace the shaky Les Aspin) under President William Clinton. Admiral Inman voluntarily, but somewhat bitterly, withdrew his nomination.

Blinded citizenry

What about this inherently provocative issue of the selective sharing of sophisticated and very sensitive information? To what extent may one now even speak in public discourse of this larger matter of N.S.A.’s own “sharing of intelligence” with non-American recipients? What are the criteria and standards of judgment and the just limits here, as encryption systems (and steganography) make even legal surveillance so much more difficult, also for F.B.I.? If N.S.A. truly needs to conduct domestic monitoring, does it also need, first, a “Legal Cover” from F.B.I.? Or, because of the new military “Areas of Responsibility” (AORs) in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), is such a cover or approval even needed any longer? Or may a Defense Agency, like N.S.A. or D.I.A., now directly support the U.S. Northern Command in carrying out its own intelligence requirements? What does the citizenry really know of these matters?

What are the boundaries for military intelligence in the domestic arena?

Although the final plans were worked on for some years beforehand, as may be reasonably imagined and expected, the Northern Command itself was only formally established—though without any public or constitutional debate—on 25 April 2002 at Peterson AFB (near Colorado Springs) in Colorado; and it became operational as a major military command on 1 October 2002. Its Commander is a four-star General, or its equivalent Navy Flag Rank, as an Admiral. Given the Northern Command’s large Area of Responsibility (A.O.R.)—now even spreading further up through Canada to the Arctic Regions—most of it nonetheless being the domestic territory of the United States (as well as the contiguous countries and the various strategic routes of access into the continental U.S.), to what extent may the Combatant Commander now legally, responsibly, and indispensably, conduct Intelligence Operations of various sorts within the domestic U.S.? To what extent, moreover, may that Commander now also rely on Foreign Intelligence Services, especially those who have more competence in foreign languages and cultures, and those who, like the British and the Israeli Mossad itself, have assets and special access all over the world? These are big issues, and not to be evaded.

What Northern Command?

Related to these fundamental questions, and to the seeming lack of public discussion on these searching issues and the Constitutional implications, was another surprise I revealingly encountered, now almost nine years ago.
This set of incidents, compactly occurring at a one-day seminar near Washington D.C. in the spring of 2005, may further help us to understand this important matter of our own putative control of—or someone else’s control of—the United States’ external and internal borders.

A European friend of mine and I were invited to this seminar, essentially a conference on Privacy and Security and the U.S. Constitution. It was sponsored by and, in large part, put on by Patrick Buchanan and some of his Libertarian and other friends, such as Terry Jeffrey, Robert Novak, and Arnaud de Borchgrave; but also with the intentionally invited participation of some well-known “Neo-Conservatives,” most of them Jewish, such as the very candid Michael Ledeen, whom Buchanan referred to always as “Brother Ledeen,” even while politely disagreeing with him.

During a longer break in the presentations and counterpointing panel discussions, I went up to Pat Buchanan, first to speak of the recent death (on 15 February) of our mutual friend, Dr. Samuel T. Francis; and then to ask Pat why the new Military “Homeland Command”—the Northern Command—had not been even mentioned during the conference so far, must less discussed. Pat looked up and said: “What is the Northern Command? I have not heard of this.” Astounded by his words, I started to tell him what it was, and also how from 1999-2002 I was also somewhat involved in the larger formulation of the new Unified Command Plan (UCP), at least in those portions related to the worldwide responsibilities of the U.S. Special Operations Command (of which I was then a member, and also teaching at the Joint Special Operations University in Florida) as to how U.S. SOCOM would actually, or potentially, co-ordinate with the then-newly-proposed Northern Command itself. I regret to say, however, that Pat showed very little interest in this matter or its implications, and, somewhat distracted, he suddenly said to me: “Rob, you must excuse me; the photographer is here now and wants to take some pictures.” I stepped aside and returned to my seat, but Pat Buchanan never came back to me about this matter, nor did he even bring it up for discussion during the remainder (the second half) of the Seminar.

An Israeli angle to the Hanssen case, an Israeli angle to the Hanssen case………………

Some four years before Pat Buchanan’s conference, Robert Hanssen of the F.B.I.’s National Security Division (NSD)—Division 5—was arrested, on 18 February 2001, for his complex and protracted espionage against the United States, since at least 1985. In 1995, with one of my students from the Joint Military Intelligence College, I had had an extended and richly substantive conversation with Robert Hanssen at the Department of State, where he was then the Head of Counter-Intelligence and the main Liaison between the F.B.I. and the Department of State, on an explicit and extended detail from the Bureau’s National Security Division 5. One of my students was especially concerned about what was being then at least inattentively—or perhaps deliberately—given over to the Russians by the F.B.I., and was seeking Robert Hanssen’s aid as to how he may deal with that grave matter of “computer security” (and more), even by writing a Classified Master’s Thesis at the Joint Military Intelligence College, perhaps even with him (Hanssen) as one of the Readers on his Thesis Committee, if he would accept. Which he did. (But the Thesis was, regrettably, never completed, after all.)

However, before we entered into further discussion about specific things—some of them highly classified—Hanssen handed me a State Department Cable which had been sent out almost a year

4 The 23 April Conference was entitled “Preserving a Nation: America’s Security in the Age of Terrorism.”
before to all of our various Host Countries abroad which were hosting a U.S. Embassy, or at least a Consulate. The Cable simply asked to what extent, if any, would those Hosts have any objection if the U.S. sent abroad, as Diplomatic Representatives of the U.S., single-sex couples. That Cable was dated sometime in 1994, but I do not recall the exact date. When Robert Hanssen saw my shocked countenance, he himself said: “What else is there to take away from this country?” (I later told two specially dedicated offices in the Intelligence Community all about this lengthy conversation—offices especially concerned with the Damage Assessment of what Hanssen had allegedly done—that is, all about this one-time interview and discussion with this formidable man; and also what the Ha’aretz English-language newspaper itself had mysteriously said shortly after Robert Hanssen’s 2001 arrest—something the Community, as it turned out, did not yet know. What Ha’aretz said—in an obviously censored article—was: “There is an Israeli angle to the Robert Hanssen Case.” What is more, the article used the rhetorical device of a repeated “Anaphora” for emphatic purposes, but still, thereby, to conceal the fuller truth—probably under obligation and official pressure from the Israeli State. That is to say, there were at least eight separate paragraphs of the relatively short Ha’aretz article which all began with the same words: “There is an Israeli angle to the Robert Hanssen Case.”

Black ops and Black funds

To this day, I have no idea of what was meant, although Hanssen himself greatly admired the Israelis—their competence and their dedication—as he explicitly told me in our State Department conversation, and he even knew of the Black Operations conducted by the Israelis, the ones we knew of, and sometimes co-operated with; and even some of those we did not approve of, but still knew about: both the domestic ones and the ones abroad. But, other than that, I could not understand the meaning of the Israeli article, even while knowing that Hanssen’s special-liaison position in the State Department as the Head of Counter-Intelligence (though not a Foreign Service Officer himself) gave him very privileged access, even to multiple “compartmented programs” (SAP/SARs). Because of his stated responsibilities, like all those “financial types” who have to handle “Black Funds,” he was often enough himself “above the compartments,” in the technical language of the covert world. In any case, Robert Hanssen, as many have cautiously come to see, had a very complex mind, and seems to have had, over many years, a very complex set of motivations, as well.

The areas of ambiguous overlap

Under modern conditions of technology, how does one adequately protect, much less control, one’s external and internal borders, and their overlapping (sometime ambiguous) jurisdictions? As in the historical and continuing struggles between the Mediaeval Sacerdotium and the Imperium, or between Church and State even in modern Concordats, the difficult problems of Jurisdiction and Power always were to be found, not so much in the strictly spiritual matters (the “Spiritualia”) or in the strictly temporal matters (the “Temporalia”), but, rather, in those areas of overlap (the “Mixta”)—what the Germans call “Die Schnittmenge”—as is seen in a Venn Diagram, where, for example, the unequivocally demarcated areas of “Purity” and unmistakable “Danger” do then ambiguously overlap. (This phenomenon is studied in the anthropologist, Mary Douglas’ excellent 1966 book, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo, where she shows how the areas of ambiguous overlap are,

---

5 A “SAP” is a “Special Access Program”; and “SAR” means “Special Access Required.” It was often drolly acknowledged that “SAP/SARs”—given their lures to secret knowledge and special moral dangers—“need adult supervision.”
therefore, areas of much greater risk, hence the need for greater protections and for stricter prohibitions, “tabus” and disciplines, instead of subversive equivocations.) But with our overlapping military-police jurisdictions, and with our “porous borders”—also to the north—and with electronic finance and commercial transactions and the flow of visitors and immigrants or refugees, how does one form a sufficient “strategic defense-in-depth” of the Homeland and protect our “Frontier Marches”: to protect the Borders, as it were, the meaningful Boundaries? For, we also have the matter of contiguous states (Canada, Mexico) and the alluring refuges, and even the forward operating bases, in the offshore islands to deal with, and in a reasonable, hence moral, manner.

**What kind of deception can we afford**

In one’s Grand Strategy, moreover, how does one co-ordinate the “Over There” with the “Over Here”? And how could the citizens of the U.S. do any of this without the indispensable help of Foreign Allies and Foreign Intelligences Services? But, which ones, and under what conditions, under what enforceable conditions? Though we are to expect some deception (as well as self-deception), what kinds of deception can we afford? Here again, in this sober matter of a “Risk Assessment,” one recalls one of the most decisive questions: “What can we afford to lose and how much will it cost us?” (To include moral, spiritual, and opportunity costs, not only the more obvious material and financial costs.)

If I still had the chance today to do so, I would still ask these kinds of questions to the various Israelis (and to their staunch supporters) I have known. And I would present many arguments still from General Harkabi’s own book, *Israel’s Fateful Hour* (1986, 1988)—although he did not then think in the mid-1980s that Israel could ever have as much influence within and over the United States as Israel now has in 2014—some twenty-six years later. We now, however, also better understand some of the new forms of “Eretz Yishrael” and of “Nationalist Judaism.” General Shimon Erem (d. 27 May 2012) also deftly understood those things.

© 2014 Robert D. Hickson